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Agriculture is an important source of income for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), which currently
rules over large parts of the breadbaskets of the two countries. It has received limited attention compared
to other sources of ISIS revenues such as oil, looting, ransom, foreign donations and various forms of tax-
ation. We estimate winter crops production of wheat and barley in ISIS-controlled areas in both Syria and
Iraq for the years 2014–2015 and irrigated summer crops production (cotton) in Northeast Syria. We
show that remote sensing can give a credible estimation of agricultural production in the absence of
statistics. With evidence from MODIS Aqua and Terra Satellites as well as Landsat imagery, we find that
agricultural production in ISIS-controlled Syrian and Iraqi zones has been sustained in 2014 and 2015,
despite the detrimental impact of conflict. After a drought in 2014 production was able to capitalize
on improved rainfalls in 2015. First indications show that the winter grain harvest of 2016 in Iraqi terri-
tories of ISIS was significantly above pre-conflict mean and below pre-conflict mean in its Syrian territo-
ries. We also show how water flows along the Euphrates have impacted production. We estimate the
revenue that ISIS can derive from wheat and barley production and the likely magnitude of an exportable
surplus. Agricultural production gives the group a degree of resilience, although its economy is not sus-
tainable in the longer run and could be affected by military collapse. Taxation of recurrent income
streams such as agriculture will become more important for ISIS as its extractive sources of revenues
show signs of dwindling. Beside non-grain food imports, agricultural production is crucial for its political
legitimacy by ensuring food provision to the broader population. Food security considerations would
require a high priority in any post-ISIS reconstruction effort and would need to include the rehabilitation
of supply chains for agricultural inputs such as quality seeds and fertilizers.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In 2013 and 2014 the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) estab-
lished itself in the main grain producing regions of the two coun-
tries. On the one hand ISIS’s onslaught impacted agriculture;
farmers were displaced, supplies of subsidized input factors were
disrupted and procurement of grain at subsidized prices by the
government in Baghdad broke down. On the other hand ISIS has
considered food related infrastructure such as silos as strategic
assets. Like oil refineries it has sought to take them over intact.
Agriculture is a means to facilitate food security in its territories
and a source of tax income that becomes increasingly importantas other sources of revenues from extractive sources such as oil,
ransom and confiscations are dwindling.
We first provide a theoretical and empirical background by ana-
lyzing the ISIS economy and what role agriculture plays in it. We
then give an overview of the used materials and methods. We
show that GIS and remote sensing analysis of agricultural produc-
tion is a useful tool in the absence of statistics. We do so by corre-
lating production in non-conflict years with growing seasons’
remotely-sensed derived vegetation indices, namely the Enhanced
Vegetation Index (EVI) (Huete et al., 2002; Huete and Justice,
1999).
We find that agricultural production in ISIS territory has proven
to be resilient, despite the impact of conflict. By analyzing changes
in water volumes in the Assad Lake and consequently flows along
the Euphrates we give a concrete example of how conflict related
events have affected agricultural production. Based on crop and
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likely magnitude of revenues that ISIS can derive from wheat and
barley production. We conclude that the production of an agricul-
tural surplus, namely grains, becomes more important for ISIS as
non-recurrent income streams have declined. Although the ISIS
economy is not sustainable in the longer run and may well face
military collapse, agriculture currently gives it a degree of
resilience.2. Theoretical and empirical background
2.1. The ISIS economy
ISIS aspires to be a state; as such it is not a mere terrorist orga-
nization. It spends two thirds to three quarters of its revenues on
its military and security apparatus (Al-Tamimi, 2015a; Jones and
Solomon, 2015), but food provision, health care and power gener-
ation feature prominently as well in self-portrayals of its propa-
ganda media. Provision of services requires resources, which
raises the question how sustainable the ISIS economy is (Hansen-
Lewis and Shapiro, 2015; Woertz, 2014).
ISIS does not publish economic statistics; estimates rely on
leaked documents, hearsay, accounts by refugees and occasional
news from people within ISIS territory. The main sources of income
for ISIS have been oil and gas production; other resource extraction
such as phosphate mines and cement factories; transit fees and tar-
iffs; bank looting, extortion and human trafficking; taxation of
agriculture; looting of cultural artifacts; kidnapping for ransom;
donations from abroad; and taxation of the salary of civil servants
in ISIS territory that the government in Baghdad continued to pay
until summer 2015 (Al-Tamimi, 2015a; Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), 2015; Jones and Solomon, 2015; Solomon et al., 2015;
Solomon and Jones, 2015).
Many of these income sources are non-sustainable one-off
events, not recurrent revenue. As the geographic expansion of ISIS
territory has stalled and gone partly into reverse since late 2014
they have suffered.
ISIS oil production, never large by regional standards and in
need of sophisticated know-how, has declined since January
2014 based on a study of satellite data that measures the flaring
of associated gas of oil production (Hansen-Lewis and Shapiro,
2015). It has been further affected by intensified military action
of the US and Russia against oil infrastructure and transportation
fleets at the end of 2015. Most of the oil is consumed domestically
or traded to other parts of Syria, rather than smuggled to neighbor-
ing countries (Solomon et al., 2015). Current oil revenues are prob-
ably much below earlier estimates by the US Treasury of monthly
$40 million; also because of oil price declines on global markets
(House of Commons, 2016c; van Heuvelen, 2015). Ransom pay-
ments for Western hostages have dried up and hostages from
abducted domestic population fetch much lower per capita ran-
soms (Belli et al., 2014).
The extent to which private and public funds from the Gulf
countries have ended up in ISIS coffers is a matter of debate. The
fundamentalist Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that prevails in
Saudi Arabia and Qatar shows some similarities with the ideology
of ISIS, but Gulf countries officially oppose the terror group. By now
they see it as a threat to themselves, even though it fights against
their rival Iran and its allies, the Assad regime in Damascus and the
Shiite led government in Baghdad. Gulf countries have participated
in international military coalitions against ISIS and Saudi Arabia
has declared it a terrorist organization. Although there is no proof
that Gulf governments have supported ISIS directly, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar have spent lavishly on other rebel groups in Syria, some
of which later on joined ISIS and took their Gulf funded weaponsand experience with them (House of Commons, 2016c; Weiss
and Hassan, 2015; Zelin, 2014). There is also evidence that private
donors from the Gulf have in fact funded ISIS, especially via Qatar
and Kuwait where they had more leeway to operate as David
Cohen, the US Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial
intelligence, pointed out in 2014 (Mendick, 2014) and as journalist
Elizabeth Dickinson has outlined in a series of articles (Dickinson,
2015).
There have been increased efforts to crack down on such funds
by Gulf governments; presumably indirect public and direct pri-
vate flows from the Gulf to ISIS are smaller by now than in
2013/14. Yet considerable loopholes continue to exist as the U.S.
State Department has outlined (U.S. Department of State, 2016).
Luay Khatteeb, Executive Director of the Iraq Energy Institute,
argued in a hearing of the UK Parliament in 2016 that ISIS’s oil
income has been vastly overstated and instead suspected foreign
inflows from the Gulf and Turkey as a major funding source
(House of Commons, 2016a,c). In the same series of hearings Air
Vice Marshal Edward Stringer estimated that ISIS derived 40% of
its income from oil, 40% from taxation and 20% from other sources
such as donations, ransom and antiquity looting. Yet he admitted
that this mix might have shifted to 30% from oil sales and 50% from
taxation as a result of the recent decline in oil revenues. Among
non-oil revenues agriculture ranks prominently, according to the
Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin ISIS made $250 million
from phosphate sales, $200 million from barley and rye and
$100 million from cement in 2015 (Nichols and Irish, 2015).
The stop of salary payments by the government in Baghdad to
civil servants in ISIS territory in the summer of 2015 was particu-
larly painful for ISIS, as their taxation was one of its most impor-
tant revenue sources, yielding hundreds of millions of dollars
(Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2015, Solomon and Jones,
2015). The bombardment of a cash storage site in Mosul in January
2016 hurt the liquidity situation of ISIS. There have also been
efforts to curtail the illegal access of ISIS to the dollar auctioning
system of the Iraqi Central Bank, which has offered it opportunities
to earn spread fees and launder money (House of Commons,
2016a).
ISIS had to cut the salaries of its fighters by half at the end of
2015, which is indicative of considerable financial stress (Al-
Tamimi, 2015b). Against this backdrop recurrent taxation becomes
more important for ISIS, arbitrary taxation and outright protection
rackets have increased (House of Commons, 2016a,b). Agriculture
is the predominant economic activity in its territories and an obvi-
ous candidate.
2.2. ISIS, agriculture and food distribution
Agriculture is important for ISIS as a source of revenue and to
safeguard domestic food supplies. In 2015 the group banned grain
exports fromMosul to ensure ‘‘self-sufficiency” of the city (Joumah,
2015). It has sought to control food prices to prevent public discon-
tent, forced landowners to continue agricultural production
despite problematic commercial incentives and rented out confis-
cated land of refugees to maintain domestic production (FAO
et al., 2015a). The jihadist manual The Management of Savagery
(idarat al-tawahhush) that has a cult following among ISIS sup-
porters identifies access to territories with food production as vital
for control of conquered areas. It advocates consolidation of power
in rural areas and taking the fight to population centers later on
(McCants, 2015; Naji, 2004).
Former Baath officers within ISIS’ ranks are aware of the strate-
gic nature of agriculture. During the UN embargo (1990–2003) the
Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein expanded cultivated area
by a fifth to spur domestic food production (Gibson et al., 2012). It
used food allocation as a tool to stabilize the regime, trade favors
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capturing dams, ISIS used denial of access to water and flooding as
means of political control and military coercion like Saddam Hus-
sein did when flooding the marshes in the south of Iraq to repel Ira-
nian forces and drying them up later to subjugate Shiite rebels
(Ahram, 2014, 2015; von Lossow, 2016).
ISIS has regarded food related infrastructure such as silos as
strategic assets. In 2014 it confiscated 1 million tons of grain from
government storage facilities in North Iraq and transferred them
for milling to Syria, which left 400,000 farmers with unpaid receiv-
ables (Fick, 2014, 2015; Fick and Dahan, 2014). This confiscation
largely accounts for estimates of $200 million of revenues from
agriculture in 2014 (Solomon and Jones, 2015; Thomson Reuters
Infographic, 2014). ISIS has also confiscated agricultural machinery
from farmers and forced them to lease it back (Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), 2015).
Unlike the Iraqi government, ISIS is not offering producer subsi-
dies. In early 2015 farmers in ISIS territory were offered wheat
prices around $220–230, which was roughly in line with interna-
tional price levels, but only about a third of the subsidized govern-
ment price (FAO and WFP, 2015; Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), 2015; Woertz, 2015). ISIS tried to smuggle wheat into the
Public Distribution System (PDS); the Iraqi government in turn
did not budget for procurement from ISIS territory to prevent such
smuggling and withhold government support for Sunni areas that
it suspected of ISIS support (Fathallah, 2015). The Iraqi PDS is the
largest public food program in the world. It was established in
1990 at the time of a multilateral UN embargo in the wake of Iraq’s
Kuwait war (Gordon, 2010; WFP et al., 2008). Beside favorable pro-
curement prices for farmers its main purpose is the allocation of
subsidized food baskets. In theory it covers 99% of the people, pro-
vides 85% of required calories and 68% of those actually consumed
(World Bank et al., 2011). Considerable gaps in coverage exist and
they have been growing as a result of unrest. As an untargeted sub-
sidy scheme it is regarded as expensive and inefficient, yet still
indispensable in assuring food security of vulnerable segments of
the population (Amendola et al., 2010; World Bank, 2005).
Beyond confiscations ISIS taxes ongoing agricultural production.
A zakat tax of 5% is raised on irrigated crops and of 10% on rainfed
crops (Solomon and Jones, 2015; Weiss and Hassan, 2015). Wheat
and barley are the most important crops. In a leaked financial doc-
ument of the ISIS administration of Dair Ezzor, they accounted for
60% of monthly agricultural taxes, followed by camels (27%) and
fruit (13%). Agricultural taxes accounted for almost 10% of total
revenue of $8.4 million of the Dair Ezzor chapter for a one month
period in December 2015–January 2016 (Al-Tamimi, 2015a). For
our 2015 estimate of wheat and barley production (see Sections
4.1 and 4.3), we took the share of irrigated agriculture and the rel-
ative share of wheat and barley cultivation in various ISIS areas
before the war as reported in government statistics, multiplied
them with reported procurement prices in spring 2015 of $220
per ton of wheat and $160 per ton of barley and applied the respec-
tive zakat rate. In case of a thorough reach of taxation this would
have added up to an income from wheat and barley of $56 million
in 2015, most of which ($46 million) would have come fromwheat.
This is considerably higher than other estimates of above $20 mil-
lion that also include cotton (Solomon and Jones, 2015).
ISIS revenue generation from agriculture goes beyond wheat
and barley and includes livestock, fruit and cotton. It also goes
beyond farming and extends along the value chain, including tax-
ation of processing and distribution (e.g. flour mills, trucks). ISIS
also trades grain on its own account and uses captured grain stor-
age facilities to sell when prices are high (Solomon and Jones,
2015).
The FAO, WFP and a number of NGOs have undertaken rapid
food security assessments in conflict-affected provinces of Iraqsuch as Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala in 2015 (FAO et al.,
2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e). They had to grapple with
the security situation and were not as comprehensive as earlier
nation-wide food security assessments and socio-economic sur-
veys (ILO et al., 2013; WFP et al., 2008; World Bank, 2013; World
Bank et al., 2008). Beside random household surveys they relied
on interviews with key informants and internally displaced people
(IDP) at relatively safe locations and focus group discussions. The
FAO has also undertaken a food security assessment of Syria that
includes non-government territories (FAO and WFP, 2015). Such
assessments and reports by journalists paint a picture of threat-
ened food security in ISIS territory as well as in other parts of Iraq
and Syria. This is in line with an international study of panel data
from 1960 to 99 that reveals that food costs typically rise during
civil wars, but not so much during international wars (Ali and
Lin, 2010).
ISIS does not entertain a system of subsidized food provision on
the scale of the Iraqi PDS that is crucial for food security of vulner-
able segments of the population, but has been affected by disrup-
tions (Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and FAO, 2014, REACH, 2015).
Consumer prices in ISIS territory are considerably higher than in
the rest of Iraq and Syria, based on telephone surveys of the World
Food Program (WFP) and reports by journalists (Salloum, 2015;
WFP, 2015). Food prices in areas that have been immediately
affected by conflict have sometimes been more than double the
prices in Baghdad and stayed high after hostilities subsided. The
price of a food basket in Anbar was 25–40% higher than in Baghdad
in 2015 (FAO et al., 2015a; WFP, 2015). Price differentials for wheat
flour and sugar were particularly pronounced and dietary diversity
declined as meat and dairy products and vegetables became less
accessible. Food insecurity and negative coping mechanisms
increased, such as reducing food consumption qualitatively and
quantitatively, spending savings, accumulating debt and selling
assets (FAO et al., 2015a, 2015e). Negative coping strategies are
not sustainable over time; the risk of food insecurity is going to
increase as they exhaust themselves, particularly for the most vul-
nerable, the rural dwellers and IDP. Severe food insecurity that
indicates outright hunger still remained limited in 2015, even in
a conflict region like Anbar, but this might change over time as vir-
tually every household there was affected by either mild or moder-
ate food insecurity (FAO et al., 2015a). Severe food insecurity and
famine have been reported in places that have been under siege,
especially by forces of the Assad regime in Syria, but also by ISIS
in Dair Ezzor and Amerli and by Iraqi government forces in Fallujah
(Alfred, 2016; Jomana Karadsheh et al., 2014; Naylor, 2016).
Conflict has had a negative impact on agriculture in Syria and
Iraq, ranging from the immediate impact of conflict, legacy issues
like land mines, displacements of farmers and disruption of supply
chains and distribution channels (Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and
FAO, 2014, FAO et al., 2015a; Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015a; Jaafar et al.,
2015). Reuters quoted FAO experts who expected a decline of the
2014 wheat harvest in Al-Raqqa by up to 70% (Fick, 2015). Com-
pared to these bleak expectations, our satellite imagery analysis
in Section 4 shows that agriculture in ISIS territory has held up
remarkably well. In Al-Raqqa for example it only remained slightly
below the pre-conflict mean in 2014 and increased again in 2015.
2.3. ISIS territory and its agricultural potential
ISIS territory encompasses much of what the geographer W. B.
Fisher termed the ‘‘upper Mesopotamian region” (Fisher, 1978),
which entails the main grain producing areas of Syria and Iraq.
Whereas the lower part of the river system has land forms that
are associated with fluviatile deposition like marshes, lagoons
and levees, the upper Mesopotamian region north of Ramadi
is characterized by erosion features, particularly unruly flood
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agriculture in its northern parts, close to the border with Turkey.
In contrast to the Mediterranean coastlands where fruit and veg-
etable cultivation is prevalent and southern Mesopotamia where
data and rice cultivation can be found, wheat, cotton and barley
production dominates in the region of northern Mesopotamia.
Most of ISIS territory in 2015 (80%) was within the Euphrates
Basin andmore than two thirds of its total crop zones were in Syria.
ISIS controlled Dair Ezzor (except the city), Al-Raqqa, half of Aleppo,
and the southern portion of Al-Hassake. These governorates pro-
duced on average 77% of Syrian wheat production and 72% of barley
before the war (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in
Syria, 2014). In Iraq ISIS controlled 60% of the croplands in Ninewa,
and 75% in Kirkuk. In 2014, Ninewa and Kirkuk produced 40% of
Iraq’s wheat and Ninewa alone 56% of Iraq’s barley. In comparison
the agricultural potential is limited in Al-Anbar province, which is
largely held by ISIS, too (Central Statistical Organization, 2014).
Wheat constitutes the lion’s share of winter crops production in
Al-Hassake (96%), Al-Raqqa (93%) and Aleppo (73%), with barley
being the second largest harvested crop.
Annual rainfall does not exceed 400 mm within the semi-arid
regions of Aleppo, Al-Hassake and Northern part of Al-Raqqa
(Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015a). Rainfall decreases to less than
200 mm along the Euphrates in Al-Raqqa and Dair Ezzor. Winter
temperatures are in the range 3–12 C. Most of the winter crop-
lands in ISIS territory are rainfed, ranging from 70% in Al-Hassake
and Al-Raqqa to 93% in Ninewa. Only in Dair Ezzor and Kirkuk a
majority of crops are irrigated (Central Statistical Organization,
2014; Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Syria, 2014).Fig. 1. Study area, ISIS influence area (US Department of Defense, April 2015) and distr
lands (Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015a) in Syria and Iraq.Limits of ISIS controlled territory shown in Fig. 1 were derived
from the map of the US Department of Defense (USDD) that was
published in April 2015 (US Department of Defense (USDD),
2015). It includes territorial losses of ISIS since its peak expansion
in August 2014 to Kurdish forces in Kobane, Ninewa and Kirkuk
and to forces of the federal government and Shiite militias in Tikrit
and Diyala. It does not include renewed territorial expansion of ISIS
in Ramadi and Palmyra that occurred in May 2015 (Ramadi fell
back to Iraqi government forces in December 2015, Palmyra to Syr-
ian government forces in March 2016) and ISIS’ losses to Kurdish
forces in the North of Syria and Iraq since June 2015 (e.g. Tal Abyad
east of Kobane and the Sinjar Mountains).
The USDD map has been criticized for overstating US successes
in fighting ISIS by omitting ISIS’ territorial gains in the west of Syr-
ia, like the Damascus suburb Yarmouk and for obscuring ISIS
expansions in Dair Ezzor, Salamiyya and Hit (Mak, 2015). These
disputes concern predominantly urban areas. Hence, with the
exception of the losses in northern Syria and Sinjar the map gives
a good approximation of agricultural production capacities that
ISIS was able to access to varying degrees in December 2015. It also
gives an indication, which agricultural lands on the borders of
these areas have likely experienced heightened impact from con-
flict. Its boundaries should not be conceived as clear-cut and static.
It shows areas were the group is ‘‘dominant”; its operational reach
can go beyond these boundaries and the degree of control within
the territory varies as the Institute for the Study of War has out-
lined in a series of consecutively updated maps that differentiate
between ISIS control, support and attack zones (Institute for the
Study of War (ISW), 2015).ibutions of cultivated lands (Landsat 30 m Global Land cover dataset) and irrigated
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3.1. Landcover and reported agricultural production data
For agricultural winter crops production estimates we use the
Landsat-derived 30 m Global Land cover (GLC) (Jun et al., 2014).
The dataset comprises ten types of land cover, including forests,
artificial surfaces and wetlands, for the years 2000 and 2010
extracted from Landsat and Chinese HJ-1 satellite-derived images.
The layer was spatially subset to include only cultivated lands as
per the classification scheme used within the dataset. For summer
production we use the MCD12Q2 Land cover product that provides
500-m resolution grid of land-cover mapping as developed by the
University of Maryland Department of Geography (UMD) classifi-
cation (Friedl et al., 2010). The version used herein (V051) provides
a temporal coverage on Land cover mapping for the period of
record 2001–2012.
For Syria, observed wheat and barley production figures were
obtained from the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian
Reform (MOAAR) according to administrative units for the years
2000–2011 (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Syria,
2014). The derived cultivated (winter) and cropland areas were
compared to these officially reported figures and found to be
within the ±10% range, with the exception of Aleppo. Fig. 1 shows
the cultivated lands overlain by the irrigated lands.
For Iraq, production data for ISIS controlled Northern Iraq gov-
ernorates (mainly Ninewa and Kirkuk) were derived from the Iraqi
Agricultural Census Atlas. Winter wheat and barley production and
total planted area for 2002–2014 was derived from the Iraq Census
Unit for the governorates of interest. We downscale the gover-
norate data to the district data by proportion of cultivated land
in each analyzed district/sub-district. The data used in this study
along with their references are presented in Table 1.
3.2. Remotely sensed agricultural production estimates
To gauge agricultural production in ISIS territory we take the
growing seasons’ remotely-sensed derived vegetation indices,
namely the Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI) (Huete et al., 2002;
Huete and Justice, 1999), and correlate it with production in non-
conflict years based on government statistics. The use of vegetation
indices for deriving crop yields and production has been exten-
sively used in literature. For thorough reviews the reader is
referred to (Moran et al., 1997), (Dorigo et al., 2007), (Rembold
et al., 2013), and (Mulla, 2013), among others. Examples of other
studies include (Yuping et al., 2008) for biomass and wheat yields,
(Shanahan et al., 2001) for corn yield prediction from high resolu-Table 1
Data used for the agricultural production estimated and Assad lake area analysis in this s
Parameter Frequency Resolution Source
MODIS EVI (for production
estimates)
Monthly from 16-
day product
1 km MODIS -MO
Landsat EVI (for verification of
planted areas)
8-day 30 m USGS Land P
Center (LP D
Croplands Annual 500 m MODIS -MC
Cultivated lands 2000, 2010 30 m Landsat; (Gl
Irrigated areas Variable 250 m MOD13A3, G
Crop production (Syria) Seasonal Governorate
Level
Ministry of
Syria
Crop production (Iraq) Seasonal Governorate
Level
Central Stat
Assad Lake levels 8-day 30 m Landsat 5 T
TIRS (path 1
Rainfall (Syria) Seasonal Point Ministry of
Syria
Rainfall (Iraq) Seasonal Point Central Stattion aerial photographs, (Doraiswamy et al., 2004) for crop yields
from NOAA AVHRR data, and (Sakamoto et al., 2005), who derived
crop phenology using MODIS data.
We use MODIS MOD13A2 monthly EVI data sets, derived from
both the Terra MODIS and Aqua MODIS instruments, to determine
the cumulative spring EVI (
P
EVIsp) and cumulative summer EVI
(
P
EVIsum). NASA publishes these data sets from 2000 up to the
present (NASA and Land Processes Distributed Active Archive
Center, 2013). Our approach is based on relating wheat and barley
production to the sum of EVI of their growing season (March, April,
May). Similarly EVI summed over the summer season (June, July
and August) was used to derive summer crop production esti-
mates. The cumulative vegetation index has been used for crop
yield estimates extensively (Genovese et al., 2001; Labus et al.,
2002; Mkhabela et al., 2005; Wall et al., 2008), to name a few.
First we determine the zonal means of spring and summer EVI.
We also analyze Landsat 8 images by calculating a spatial-temporal
index that identifies planted areas in the winter and spring seasons
for the years 2014 and 2015. The index is calculated by temporally
normalizing the 30 m Landsat-derived EVI (see Claverie et al., 2015
for evaluation of the Landsat EVI product), which is done by sub-
tracting the raster EVI values in late June (at peak yellowness/har-
vest) from those in early April (peak of green cover of wheat and
barley) and dividing the result by the sum of the EVI for early April
and late June. We then plot the pre-conflict agricultural production
against the zonal mean. We spatially divide each governorate into
ISIS and non-ISIS zones. The reported governorate crop production
(wheat and barley in the winter and irrigated crops like cotton in
the summer) is calculated as the weighted mean for each analyzed
zone (including ISIS areas) based on their respective proportion of
area cropped. For every year, the pre-conflict government seasonal
agricultural production figure for the zone is divided into two fig-
ures by multiplying the fraction of area planted (e.g. cultivated
lands in ISIS Hassake from GIS/total cultivated lands in Hassake)
by the production during that season in that zone to get the regio-
nal production information for that zone. The resulting figure is
then correlated with the cumulative MODIS EVI for that zone
derived from the zonal statistics performed in a GIS environment.
The calculated values are then regressed against the mean cumula-
tive spring and summer EVI as derived from zonal statistical anal-
ysis within a spatial GIS coverage. Regression parameters and their
statistical significance are presented in Tables A.1 and A.2,
respectively.
To evaluate the spatial variation of the extent of winter and
summer crops we perform the following: we calculate a standard-
ized cumulative EVI (S
P
EVI) by subtracting the resulting cumula-
tive raster’s pixel temporal EVI mean and dividing the results bytudy.
Reference
D13A3 Product NASA (2015)
rocesses Distributed Active Archive
AAC)
USGS/EROS, Sioux Falls, SD, http://lpdaac.
usgs.gov
D12Q1 Product NASA (2013)
obal Landcover) GLC 30 m Friedl et al. (2010)
oogle Earth Imagery Jaafar and Ahmad (2015a)
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in MOAAR (2014)
istical Organization, Republic of Iraq Central Statistical Organization (2014)
M, Landsat 7 ETM+, Landsat 8 OLI/
73, row 35)
Land Processes Distributed Active Archive
Center (LP DAAC)
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in MOAAR (2014)
istical Organization, Republic of Iraq Central Statistical Organization (2014)
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2011 for Syria and years 2002–2013 for Iraq. The standardization
avoids bias in the analysis by reducing the effect of natural vari-
ability (Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015a).
Due to lack of data on reservoir levels we use satellite imagery
to monitor the changes in the surface area of the Assad Lake to ana-
lyze changes in lake volume. For this purpose we analyze 40 Land-
sat scenes Landsat 5, 7, and 8 to derive a times series of the water
surface area of the Assad Lake and headwaters 25 km south of
Turkish borders down to the Tabqa dam. In order to calculate the
time series of the surface area of the lake, a supervised classifica-
tion scheme in ArcGISTM (Richards, 1986, p. 281) was implemented
to classify the water area.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Syrian production
During the past 16 years, three major droughts have occurred in
Syria and the wider Fertile Crescent that have negatively affected
agricultural production: 2000, 2007–2010 (Kelley et al., 2015)
and recently in 2014. This impact has been particularly pro-
nounced in rainfed areas, while irrigated areas showed more resi-
lience and have been less affected by rural poverty (Szonyi et al.,
2010). We estimate production in 2014 and 2015 by deriving
regression equations between the cumulative spring EVI (
P
EVIsp)
for the cropped lands and agricultural production (NASA and Land
Processes Distributed Active Archive Center, 2015). The production
estimates for those two years are presented in Table 2. We also use
the S
P
EVI (in spring and summer) to determine the conflict effect
in non-drought years (Figs. 2, A.1, 3, and A.2). The peak of produc-
tion in Syria appears to be in 2002. Since then it has declined, with
some recovery in wetter years (2009, 2010). Following the Syrian
conflict that started in March 2011, agriculture was adversely
affected. We measure the impact of conflict by deriving the stan-
dardized
P
EVI and calculating the zonal statistics over ISIS and
non-ISIS zones (Fig. 3). We then compare the results to winter rain-
fall data. When a normal or high rainfall year overlaps with a low
standardized
P
EVI, we deduce a conflict effect.
The decline in winter crops production is evident one year into
the civil war in 2012. Although rainfalls were normal during that
year, S
P
EVIsp shows the highest negative deviation from the mean
in the Orontes Basin (Homs, Hama, Idlib and Aleppo) and irrigatedTable 2
Pre and post-conflict mean wheat and barley production in Syrian and Iraqi territories un
Governorates Estimated Wheat and Barley prod
MT)
Pre-conflict mean 2014
Syria - Al-Hassake 1779 1536
Syria - ISIS Al-Hassake 706 543
Syria - NISIS Al-Hassake 1071 993
Syria -Aleppo 1042 524
Syria -ISIS Aleppo 524 337
Syria -NISIS Aleppo 518 198
Syria -Dair Ezzor (ISIS) 523 520
Syria -Al-Raqqa (ISIS) 696 636
Iraq - Ninewa 873 1183
Iraq - ISIS Ninewa 545 850
Iraq - NISIS Ninewa 348 410
Iraq - Kirkuk 353 376
Iraq - ISIS Kirkuk 263 284
Iraq - NISIS Kirkuk 91 96
ISIS Regions of Syria. 2450 2036
ISIS Iraq (Ninewa & Kirkuk) 808 1134
NISIS Regions of Syria (Hassake, Aleppo) 1589 1190
NISIS Regions of Iraq (Ninewa Kirkuk) 439 506areas of Dair Ezzor (Fig. 3C), where severe clashes between govern-
ment forces and the opposition occurred (Jaubert et al., 2014). In
the northwestern part of Syria, bordering Turkey, the conflict effect
is also visible: dry Al-Hassake versus green Turkey just across the
border. This is an indication that the conflict effect can be disentan-
gled from the changes in vegetation due to natural variability
(Glynn and Ichino, 2014). Al-Hassake witnessed winter production
declines in 2011 and 2012 and a recovery in 2013.
During the third year of the conflict (2013), agricultural produc-
tion appears to be sustained in most Syrian territories with the
exception of Idlib and western parts of Homs and Hama (Table 2).
There is even an increase in production in some parts of Homs and
Hama, Al-Raqqa, Dair Ezzor and Al-Hassake.
The effect of drought was a major blow to Syrian agriculture in
2014, especially in the Orontes basin (Fig. 2C). During this year, the
drought effect cannot be separated from the conflict in almost all
Syrian territories because both drought and conflict can lead to a
low S
P
EVIsp. The most profound impact on agricultural production
was in Aleppo governorate, where wheat and barley production
was 36% below the pre-conflict decadal average in ISIS territory
and 62% below mean in non-ISIS territory. The only resilience to
drought in 2014 was in the Kurdish held area northeast of
Al-Hassake, where supplemental irrigation from groundwater
was able to mitigate drought effects (Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015b).
In 2015, winter production remained 20% below average in
non-ISIS areas and 13% below average in ISIS zones in the south
of Al Hassake. In 2014 and 2015, S
P
EVIsp is high on Turkish
territory bordering Al-Hassake, while it is very low on the adjacent
Syrian territory (Fig. 2C and D). The recovery in Aleppo in 2015
is attributed to increased rainfalls, which benefitted Aleppo’s
predominantly rainfed cultivation.
Winter production in Syria has decreased in all studied gover-
norates to below average values in 2014, while in 2015 it almost
increased back to normal in most ISIS regions. In 2015 production
in Syrian ISIS territory was almost at the pre-conflict average (up
from 21% in 2014), while in non-ISIS zones it was 8% below aver-
age (up from 25% in 2014). With 3.9 million tons our estimate for
the combined wheat and barley harvest all over Syria in 2015 is
higher than that of FAO and WFP (3.4 million tons) (FAO and
WFP, 2015).
Regression analysis was also used to derive summer crop pro-
duction in ISIS areas of influence. The methodology of Jaafar et al.
(2015) and Jaafar and Ahmad (2015a) is followed herein. All ofder ISIS control (2014–2015).
uction (1000 % Deviation from the pre-conflict mean
2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
1497 20 3 14 16
575 24 11 23 19
928 16 10 7 13
1122 9 11 50 8
574 8 7 36 9
539 10 15 62 4
520 11 10 20 19
735 1.4 11 9 6
1092 61 42 35 25
807 66 30 56 48
370 52 47 18 6
344 13 21 7 2
242 8 20 8 8
93 14 19 5 2
2404 11 0 21 4
1048 47 27 40 30
1468 14 12 25 8
463 44 41 15 5
Fig. 2. Standardized cumulative spring EVI (S
P
EVIsp) over cultivated lands for the years 2012–2015. Positive values indicate cultivated lands with higher productivity while
negative values indicate lower productivity as compared to pre-conflict means in both Syria and Iraq.
20 H.H. Jaafar, E. Woertz / Food Policy 64 (2016) 14–25the summer crops in Syria are irrigated and in Al-Hassake they
mainly comprise cotton with 85% of the planted area. Irrigation
infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to conflict related damage
and disruption of maintenance and spare part supplies. Results
show that there is a drastic decrease in the cumulative summer
EVI (June, July, and August,
P
EVIsum) during 2014 and 2015 in both
ISIS and non-ISIS zones (Figs. 3 and A.2). Compared to the pre-
conflict mean we estimate a 60% decrease in summer crop produc-
tion in ISIS zones in 2014 and 2015 and of 70% in non-ISIS zones
(Table 3), a remarkable drop compared to more modest declines
in 2012 and 2013 (Jaafar and Ahmad, 2015a).4.2. Analysis of Assad Lake area
The conflict effect is evident in all governorates from estimated
and reported data. While we can derive with confidence that con-
flict has affected agricultural production, remote sensing cannot
tell us how this has happened. In press reports and in our personal
interviews with experts in Beirut, Erbil, Damascus and Amman
mentioned causes included direct military impact, displacements,
burglary of equipment, and reduced incentives for farmers to cul-
tivate because of shrinking markets. Fertilizer factories, wheat silos
and irrigation infrastructure have been targeted by looting (Fick
and Dahan, 2014; Fick and Thomas, 2014; Kanaan and Na’saan,
2012). In some cases more concrete inferences about the impact
of conflict can be made from remote sensing: Downstream flowsfrom Assad Lake are instrumental in explaining crop production
along the Euphrates.
Constructed between 1968 and 1973 the Tabqa Dam (now
called Tishreen Dam) that forms the Assad Lake is important for
irrigated agriculture downstream. Beside river flows, many irriga-
tion projects in Syria also rely on groundwater abstraction, which
has increased dramatically (Voss et al., 2013). Large-scale flood
irrigation of water intensive crops like wheat and cotton were a
hallmark of the Syrian agricultural development approach
(Richards, 1991). Between 1985 and 2000 the irrigated area dou-
bled. With this expansion Syria managed to smooth out yield fluc-
tuations of rainfed agriculture and became self-sufficient in wheat
and barley by the mid-1990s, even developing a modest export
capacity. Large-scale imports only became necessary in 2008 when
the drought between 2006 and 2010 had a negative impact on Syr-
ian agriculture (de Chatel, 2014).
Dair Ezzor and Al-Raqqa that are predominantly held by ISIS did
not show a decline in production in 2013/14 and 2014/15 (Table 2).
In 2013/14 this might be attributed to their reliance on irrigation
from the Assad Lake that helped them to overcome drought effects.
Our analysis shows that the water level started to decline in
September 2013 and reached its trough in September 2014 at
538 sq. km (Fig. 4), a low that was witnessed in the past only in
1992, when Turkey stopped flows to fill the Ataturk Dam. ISIS
has used water flows through dams to serve its strategic purposes
(Ahram, 2014). In order to raise revenues, it maximized reservoir
releases to increase electricity sales to the Assad regime, with
Fig. 3. Standardized cumulative summer EVI (S
P
EVIsum) of cultivated lands for years 2012–2015. Positive values indicate cultivated lands with higher productivity while
negative values indicate lower productivity as compared to pre-conflict means in both Syria and Iraq.
Table 3
Summer Crop Production and % deviation from mean for reported (2012, 2013) and estimated (2014, 2015) summer crop production in ISIS and non-ISIS (NISIS) areas.
Areas Estimated summer production (1000 MT) % Difference from the mean
Pre-conflict meana 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015
Syria - Al-Hassake 492 54 59 28 65 89 88
Syria - ISIS Al-Hassake 80 9 10 32 66 88 88
Syria - NISIS Al-Hassake 403 50 56 22 61 88 86
Syria - Aleppo 526 338 345 6 10 36 34
Syria - ISIS Aleppo 278 196 199 6 8 29 28
Syria - NISIS Aleppo 248 146 150 5 12 41 40
Syria - Dair Ezzor (ISIS) 201 13 13 40 70 94 94
ISIS Regions of Syrian Gov (Hassake, Aleppo, Dair-Ezzor) 558 218 222 16 38 61 60
NISIS Regions of Syrian Gov (Hassake, Aleppo) 651 195 206 11 42 70 68
a For Syria mean is for years 2000–2011; for Iraq mean is for years 2002–2013.
Fig. 4. Time series of the Assad Lake area behind Tabqa dam with a sharp area
reduction in winter 2013/14.
H.H. Jaafar, E. Woertz / Food Policy 64 (2016) 14–25 21which it has maintained a relationship of tactical cooperation
(Pearce, 2014). These releases were available for winter crops irri-
gation, which could explain the relative resilience to drought in
2014 in Al-Raqqa and Dair Ezzor.
While ISIS increased downstream flows from the dam, Turkey
decreased flows into Syria, closing the gates completely in June
2014 (Enjrainy, 2014), despite an interim agreement between the
two countries in 1987 that was registered at the United Nations
in 1994 that states that Turkey provides 500 m3/s of Euphrates
water downstream its borders (United Nations Economic and
Social Conmission for Western Asia (UN-ESCWA) and
Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR), 2013).
Subsequently ISIS has rationed flows in order to refill the
reservoir behind the dam (Pearce, 2014). This affected summer
22 H.H. Jaafar, E. Woertz / Food Policy 64 (2016) 14–25production in Dair Ezzor in 2014 and 2015 (Table 3) and prompted
a shift to rainfed agriculture in Al-Raqqa in winter 2014/2015
(Fig. 2D), which witnessed above average rainfalls. Results show
that following the sharp decline in 2014–2015, the lake area is
back to normal in November 2015 as calculated from Landsat satel-
lite imagery (Fig. 4).
4.3. Iraqi production
Croplands and production in ISIS controlled regions of Al-Anbar
and Salah Al-Din within Iraq is negligible. We therefore focus on
Ninewa and Kirkuk, the two main winter crops production regions
under ISIS control. The 10-year average of cumulative spring EVI in
Iraq shows that Ninewa and to a lesser extent Kirkuk did not do
well during 2002–2012 as compared to 2013–2015 (Table 2,
Fig. A.1). This could reflect a relative neglect of agriculture in
an oil-centered economy, the fall out of the Iraq war in 2003
and the UN sanctions that lasted from 1990 to 2003 and bias of
the Iraqi Public Distribution System towards imported grains
with better flower mill qualities (higher gluten and protein
content).
Both Ninewa and Kirkuk featured increased production in 2014
when not yet partly occupied by ISIS forces (Fig. 2). This is in line
with the doubling of wheat production in Iraq by 2013/14 after
the drought induced trough in 2008/09 (USDA, 2015). Iraq has
increased its wheat yields since 2000 from very low levels below
500 kg/ha to 2000 kg/ha. In comparison, largely rain-fed barley
yields continue to flat-line. Iraq has sought to revitalize its agricul-
tural sector in its National Development Plans (NDP) 2010–14 and
2013–2017 and has identified agriculture as one of six priority
areas beside crude oil extraction, electricity, basic infrastructure,Fig. 5. Standardized March–transportation and conversion industries like petrochemicals and
fertilizers (Republic of Iraq, 2010, 2013). The plans have embraced
more market-based principles, but have also continued a practice
of supporting a degree of grain self-sufficiency via subsidized input
factors and elevated procurement prices (Schnepf, 2004; Telleria
et al., 2012; USAID, 2011).
Our analysis shows that winter crop production in 2014 and
2015 under ISIS reign is about 52% above decadal average, com-
pared to slightly (12%) above average production in non-ISIS areas.
ISIS was able to maintain an agricultural system despite negative
impacts of conflict. Kirkuk shows a slight decline (8% compared
to decadal average) in 2015, possibly due to its proximity with
government-controlled areas and the resulting intensity of conflict.
When ISIS took hold of the wheat silos in Ninewa in summer 2014,
the winter wheat was already harvested. We estimate a production
of 0.85 million tons of wheat and barley, which is in line with
reports of the Ministry of Agriculture of Iraq that they lost 1 million
tons of wheat and barley in ISIS controlled areas of Ninewa (Fick
and Thomas, 2014).
ISIS suffered considerable territorial losses in 2016. It lost Pal-
myra and Manbij in Syria, while Iraqi forces took Fallujah in Iraq
and contemplated a recapture of Mosul in the North. This added
to the losses it endured in the second half of 2015 (see Section 2.3).
Yet ISIS was still holding key agricultural regions in Al-Raqqa, Dair
Ezzor, southern Hasskah and Ninewa. Production in the ISIS con-
trolled zones of Iraq was substantial and productivity significantly
above the pre-conflict mean, especially in Ninewa as Fig. 5 shows.
In contrast productivity was below average in Aleppo and ISIS con-
trolled zones of Hassake and Dair Ezzor. For the time being it seems
that agriculture continues to be a major source of income for ISIS,
at least in Iraq and some areas of Syria.April EVI for year 2016.
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We provide a remote sensing analysis of the agricultural pro-
duction situation in Syria and Iraq after ISIS took hold of large
zones within the two countries. Our results from regression rela-
tionships between cumulative spring and summer EVI and
reported agricultural production for pre-conflict years were statis-
tically significant. The remotely sensed estimates prove to be an
adequate tool for gauging agricultural production in conflict areas
in the absence of statistics or reliable data due to adverse security
situations.
Winter cropsproductionofwheatandbarleyhasheldup remark-
ably well in ISIS territory, despitemilitary conflict, displacements of
farmers and disruption of supply chains and subsidized procure-
ment schemes. Only production of irrigated summer crops, mainly
cotton, has suffered extensively. The disruption of quality seed pro-
vision via the General Organization for Seed Multiplication (GOSM)
in Syria means, however, that agricultural production in ISIS terri-
tory andelsewhere in Syria livesonbought time. It could faceprecip-
itous production challenges when seed quality typically declines
after 3–4 planting seasons. Without rehabilitation of the GOSM or
a similar institution, the existing stock of quality seeds will be
depleted and seed supplies compromised (FAO and WFP, 2015).
As unsustainable extractive sources of income like ransom,
sequestrations and oil trade are declining, ISISwill need to relymore
on recurrent income streams, such as agriculture. We estimate that
in 2015 the groupmight have derived up to $56 million fromwheat
and barley taxation alone. In addition there is taxation of other crops
and livestock and of the processing and distribution chains. This is
considerable compared to total annualized revenue estimates by
US officials of $1 billion, half of which came from oil until spring
2015, but which is now greatly reduced (van Heuvelen, 2015). The
total value of 2.45 million tons of wheat production in ISIS territory
in 2015 roughly equaled the annualized value of ISIS oil production
during its height in late 2014 and early 2015.
Iraq and Syria were wheat net-importers before the conflict;
ISIS is not. It likely produces an exportable surplus as it has main-
tained production and the population on its territory has declined.
WorldPop statistics that combine census data with analysis of
satellite imagery yield a prewar population estimate of ISIS terri-
tory in Syria of 2.5 million and in Iraq of 4.3 million (WorldPop,
2015). After deducting 2.6 million internally displaced people
(IDPs) and refugees that have left ISIS territory in Iraq and 1 million
in Syria (Fanack Chronicle, 2015; International Organization for
Migration (IOM), 2015; UNHCR, 2015), this adds up to a current
population of 3.2 million people. This estimate chimes with Iraqi
government figures of 1.69 million people in Iraqi ISIS territory
(Brinkhoff, 2015). Syrian Census data with towns spatially clipped
to ISIS boundaries indicates a higher pre-war Syrian population in
ISIS territory of 3.8 million. Even allowing for measuring errors on
the Syrian side, overall population in ISIS territory likely does not
exceed four million people, much lower than estimates of eight
million and more that have been reported in the media. Based on
average pre-war wheat consumption (United Nations, 2015;
USDA, 2015) and our ISIS production estimate of 2.45 million tons,
this would translate into domestic consumption of 0.85 million
tons of wheat and an exportable surplus of 1.6 million tons. This
number might be even higher, as ISIS is not necessarily able or will-
ing to safeguard food allocation to all segments of the population.
Average individual consumption has likely fallen below pre-war
levels, increasing the exportable surplus.
It is a politically sensitive question where this surplus goes.
Transaction costs have soared and transport routes to the tradi-
tional markets in the west of Syria have been disrupted. Yet, ISIS
trades oil and gas to other rebel groups and the Syrian government.
The same might apply for wheat. Neighboring countries are adestination of an unregulated livestock trade from all over Syria.
Again the same might apply for wheat. There is an economic incen-
tive to smuggle wheat into the subsidized Iraqi distribution system
and to Turkey, where prices are higher according to the FAO and
WFP (FAO and WFP, 2015). This would merit further study. While
military action against agricultural facilities is questionable for
humanitarian reasons, a crackdown on such smuggling could
reduce revenue sources for ISIS.
Rural poverty in Syria has been less prevalent in areas with irri-
gated agriculture (Szonyi et al., 2010). As such areas have been par-
ticularly affected by the conflict, the poverty gap has likely
narrowed to the downside. Beside rainfed areas, irrigated agricul-
ture would require special care in reconstruction efforts after a
possible downfall of ISIS. The same applies for food security in gen-
eral. In international comparison, food insecurity has been a major
driver of conflict in the Arab world based on statistical analysis of
data spanning the years 1960–2010 (Maystadt et al., 2014;
Harrigan, 2014). This is because of high food net imports, the
resulting vulnerability to import shocks and the importance of
affordable food in the region’s social contracts. Nutrition interven-
tions, social safety nets and rehabilitation of supply chains for agri-
cultural input factors such as quality seeds and fertilizers will need
to be a high priority in any post-ISIS reconstruction effort.
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